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INTRODUCTION
In our system of federalism, two judiciaries-state and federal-operate
side by side. Congress, through powers conferred by Article III of the
*David McMillan graduated in 2009, cum laude, from Fordham University School of Law,
where he served as Senior Notes and Articles Editor on the Urban Law Journal. He offers
special thanks to the Urban Law Journal's 2009-2010 staff for their diligent assistance in
editing this Note, and to Professor Thomas Lee for his insightful commentary.
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United States Constitution,1 controls the character of the federal judiciary,
while state legislatures control the judiciaries in their respective states.2
Although state courts derive their authority from state law, the Suprem-
acy Clause3 and its underlying policies require that state courts share some
responsibility for adjudicating federal claims.' When Congress passes an
Act, for example, it is not only expected but desirable that state courts
should aid in its enforcement. The framers, by including a mandate that
state judges are bound by federal law, contemplated that state courts would
have jurisdiction over federal claims.' In fact, the Supreme Court has made
concurrent jurisdiction the general rule rather than the exception.6 More-
over, sound policy suggests that by entertaining federal claims, state courts
can help Congress promote the substantive policies underlying federal law
7
while relieving the federal judiciary of the burden of adjudicating all fed-
eral claims.8
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188 (1944); Martin H.
Redish & John Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes ofAction in State Courts, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 311, 340-46 (1976).
3. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223
U.S. 1, 57 (1912); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876); STEVEN STEINGLASS,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 9:5 (2007).
4. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 515 (1982). But see Printz V.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 347 ("In giving
state courts the power to adjudicate federal causes of action, presumably Congress ... has
decided that the substantive policies embodied in the federal statute creating the cause of
action and the federal policies concerning the administration of the federal court system are
best advanced by distributing the case burden between the state and federal courts."); STE-
INGLASS, supra note 3, § 9:7.
5. See Burt Neubome, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 725, 760 (1980) ("[T]he language of the supremacy clause itself obviously
contemplates the existence of a broadly based state responsibility over federal claims."); see
also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990). See generally Mondou, 223 U.S. at 57;
Claflin, 93 U.S. at 140; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 344 (1816); THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton).
6. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990).
7. See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 347; STEINGLASS, supra note 3, § 9:7 (noting
that Congress has the power to dictate-explicitly or by implication-that state courts exer-
cise concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims).
8. See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 347; Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Missis-
sippi and the Adequate State Ground, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 187, 207 (1965); Steven Stein-
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States, on the other hand, retain considerable discretion to delineate the
boundaries of their own courts' jurisdiction, 9 and Congress generally can-
not affix an obligation to entertain federal claims on state courts whose ju-
risdiction is inadequate to the occasion. 0 What's more, states have power-
ful incentives to keep federal claims out of their court systems. States may,
for example, either as a matter of sheer judicial economy" or as a way to
relieve state court judges from the task of dealing with unfamiliar or com-
plex federal laws, 12 seek to limit the number of federal claims occupying
state court dockets. Alternatively, a state may simply disagree with an
act's underlying policy and refuse to enforce it in its courts.
13
Determining exactly when states' interests in keeping federal claims out
of their courts should outweigh the policy that states enforce federal law
has become a matter of contention. In 2007, New York State's highest
court, the New York Court of Appeals, held that the state's trial courts of
general jurisdiction, the New York Supreme Court, could decline to enter-
tain a very specific subcategory of claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,14 the fed-
eral civil rights statute. ' 5 The plaintiff was a prisoner in a New York cor-
rectional facility who sued employees of the State Department of
Correctional Services ("DOCS") in New York Supreme Court over various
alleged civil rights infractions. The State argued that the plaintiffs claim
was barred based on a New York statute, Correction Law § 24,16 which
removed the court's subject matter jurisdiction over any civil action for
glass, State Court § 1983 Actions: A Procedural Review, 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 381, 398
(1983).
9. Mondou, 223 U.S. at 58 ("[A] state court derives its existence and functions from
the state laws .... ") (quoting Claflin, 93 U.S. at 137).
10. See, e.g., McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934); Mondou,
223 U.S. at 57.
11. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 380 (1990) (Amici contending that "suits
predicated on federal law are more likely to be frivolous and have less of an entitlement to
the State's limited judicial resources").
12. Mondou, 223 U.S. at 55.
13. See, e.g., id. at 57.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983's predecessor was one of five statutes enacted in 1871 to curb
widespread violence by the Ku Klux Klan. As it exists today, the statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any state or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 665
(1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961).
15. Haywood v. Drown, 881 N.E.2d 180, 181 (N.Y. 2007).
16. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 24 (McKinney 2003).
948 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI
damages against DOCS personnel for torts committed within the scope of
their employment. The statute required, instead, that such claims be
brought against the state in the New York Court of Claims.17 The undis-
puted purpose of the statute was to transfer liability away from individual
DOCS employees and onto the State in order to facilitate the performance
of the employees' legitimate prison duties. 8 Nevertheless, since the Court
of Claims cannot entertain § 1983 suits,19 the effect of Correction Law § 24
is to completely extinguish one fact-specific category of § 1983 claims
(i.e., damages suits against DOCS employees). This is despite the New
York Supreme Court's routine practice of adjudicating both § 1983 suits
against other state employees and state tort claims against private defen-
dants.20
Recognizing that Correction Law § 24's exclusion of a specific category
of § 1983 claim from the New York Supreme Court was questionable un-
der the Supremacy Clause, the Court of Appeals nonetheless held that the
statute was a "valid excuse" to decline to hear the suit. 21 In the court's
17. Id.; see also N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 9 (McKinney 1989), available at
http://www.nyscourtofclaims.state.ny.us/claimsact.shtml.
18. Arteaga v. New York, 527 N.E.2d 1194, 1200 (N.Y. 1988) (Simons, J., dissenting)
(stating that Correction Law § 24 permits correction officers to perform the demanding task
of maintaining safety and security within correctional facilities "undeterred by the fear of
personal liability and vexatious suits, which could substantially impair the effective per-
formance of a discretionary function"); see also Woodward v. State, 805 N.Y.S.2d 670
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005). Additionally,
the DOCS employee is not named as a defendant in the suit, with the publicity that
may attach; the employee is not served with process; the employee does not need
to retain counsel or seek representation by the Attorney General under Public Of-
ficers Law § 17; the employee does not have to answer the complaint; the em-
ployee does not have to seek indemnification by the State under § 17 if damages
are ultimately awarded; and there is no threat of attachments or liens on the em-
ployee's personal assets. By minimizing the employee's involvement in the suit,
the statute markedly diminishes the ways in which a prisoner can harass and in-
hibit a DOCS employee by the threat of personal damages liability.
Brief for Respondents at 12, Haywood v. Drown, 881 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 2007) (No. 05-
033917); see also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-q(1) (McKinney 2009) (providing that all suits for
damages against employees of the Division of Parole must be brought in the Court of
Claims against the State).
19. The Court of Claims only hears claims against the State, and the State is not a suable
"person" under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989);
White v. State, 615 N.Y.S.2d 811, 815 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1994).
20. See, e.g., James v. Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 340 N.E.2d 735 (N.Y.
1975); Young v. Toia, 413 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Brody v. Leamy, 393
N.Y.S.2d 243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
21. Haywood v. Drown, 881 N.E.2d 180, 183 (N.Y. 2007) (quoting Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356, 369 (1990)); see Missouri ex rel S. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 5 (1950); Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120 (1945); cf McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230,
234 (1934).
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view, neither the Supremacy Clause nor its underlying policies were suffi-
ciently pressing to override the State's discretion to establish the jurisdic-
tion of its courts. 2 2 It held that states are not required to create courts ame-
nable to all types of § 1983 claims, and that if a state decides not to extend
jurisdiction over a fact-specific category of state-law claims, it is free to bar
enforcement of the federal law analogue. 23 In this case, since Correction
Law § 24 applied neutrally to any civil action-state or federal-it did not
offend the Supremacy Clause's bar prohibiting discrimination against fed-
eral law.
24
This Note casts doubt on the doctrinal underpinnings of the majority
opinion in Haywood v. Drown25 and attempts to offer an affirmative char-
acterization of states' obligation to hear § 1983 claims. Part I summarizes
the events of Haywood and the positions espoused by the majority and dis-
senting opinions. Part II briefly describes the antidiscrimination princi-
ple-which requires a state court to entertain a federal claim so long as the
court would enforce an "analogous" state claim-and offers competing
views on how to define the term "analogous" state law claim. Part III then
utilizes Supreme Court cases to expose the doctrinal inaccuracies in the
New York Court of Appeals' majority opinion in Haywood. Part III.A ar-
gues that the antidiscrimination principle imposes a far broader obligation
on state courts to hear federal claims than the Haywood majority believed.
It further argues that the court misapplied the principle by concluding that
the state court had no obligation to hear the plaintiffs § 1983 suit, despite
its authority to hear generic state law tort suits. Part III.B examines the
"valid excuse" doctrine and its apparent dual purpose-to preserve states'
jurisdiction-setting discretion without undermining the supremacy of fed-
eral law-and argues that the Haywood court's version of the "analogous"
22. Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 184.
23. See id. (holding that "if a state does not extend jurisdiction to its courts to litigate a
certain type of claim, it may deprive those courts of jurisdiction over a related federal
claim").
24. Id. at 185; see also infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
25. All references to Haywood v. Drown refer to the New York Court of Appeals' 2007
decision. While this Note was in the final stages of publication, the United States Supreme
Court reviewed the decision and reversed. See Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009).
The Court held that Correction Law § 24 conflicted with § 1983's substantive policies and
therefore could not operate to bar plaintiff's § 1983 claim. Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2115
("The State's policy, whatever its merits, is contrary to Congress' judgment that all persons
who violate federal rights while acting under color of state law shall be held liable for dam-
ages."). It further held that, despite § 24's uniform treatment of state and federal law claims,
"equality of treatment does not ensure that a state law will be deemed a neutral rule of judi-
cial administration and therefore a valid excuse for refusing to entertain a federal cause of
action .... A jurisdictional rule cannot be used as a device to undermine federal law, no
matter how evenhanded it may appear." Id. at 2116.
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state law claim excuse fails to fulfill this purpose. The excuse, however,
could theoretically exist provided it comported with both the doctrine's im-
plicit balancing and with Felder v. Casey. This Note concludes by suggest-
ing a framework for evaluating the legitimacy of a state court's refusal to
enforce § 1983 claims, under which a reviewing court should examine both
the availability and adequacy of an alternative state forum to hear the §
1983 suit and the state's interest in removing jurisdiction over such suits.
I. HA YWOOD v. DRO WN
A. The Facts
In 2007, plaintiff Keith Haywood, an inmate at a New York Corrections
facility, brought a § 1983 action in New York Supreme Court against
DOCS employees alleging various civil rights infractions. 26 Apparently
DOCS officers had engaged in several conspiratorial acts-including fabri-
cating the facts of a misbehavior report of which Haywood was the subject
and falsifying the results of a urinalysis test-which were designed to
thwart the exercise of the plaintiffs due process rights. 27 The State, acting
on behalf of the DOCS defendants,28 moved to dismiss based on New York
Correction Law § 24,29 which states:
1. No civil action shall be brought in any court of the state, except by the
attorney general on behalf of the state, against any officer or employee of
the department, in his personal capacity, for damages arising out of any
act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employ-
ment and in the discharge of the duties by such officer or employee.
2. Any claim for damages arising out of any act done or the failure to per-
form any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of
the duties of any officer or employee of the department shall be brought
and maintained in the court of claims as a claim against the state.
Thus, the State argued, Correction Law § 24 vests the New York Court
of Claims with exclusive jurisdiction over all damages suits against DOCS
26. Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 180.
27. Id at 183. The plaintiff also alleged that DOCS employees conspired to fabricate
the facts of a second misbehavior report.
28. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-q(3) (McKinney 2009) (mandating that the state provide de-
fense and indemnification).
29. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 24 (McKinney 2009); see also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-q(2)
(McKinney 2009) (providing that all suits for damages against employees of the Division of
Parole must be brought in the Court of Claims against the state).
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employees, 30 and therefore, plaintiffs Supreme Court suit was improper.
Moreover, the statute prohibits plaintiff from suing the individual DOCS
employees directly; he must instead sue the State in the Court of Claims.
The trial court dismissed Haywood's claim and New York's Appellate
Division affirmed.3' On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the
plaintiff argued that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion prohibited § 24's application in barring his federal § 1983 suit. He as-
serted that Congress, by enacting § 1983, set "policy for all," 32 and that §
24 obstructs that policy by precluding a fact-specific § 1983 suit, namely,
damages suits against individual DOCS employees acting within the scope
of their employment. Additionally, § 24 discriminated against § 1983
causes of action by barring DOCS-defendant claims only, leaving the New
York Supreme Court free to adjudicate § 1983 claims against other state
actors and generic state tort suits against private defendants. The State, on
the other hand, countered that § 24 was a neutral and valid exercise of the
State's prerogative to determine its courts' jurisdictional contours. 33 It con-
tended that § 24 reflects the State's recognition that when a DOCS em-
ployee is sued for acts committed within the scope of employment, the state
is the real party in interest 34 and that, consistent with the State's conditional
waiver of sovereign immunity, 35 New York properly could require plain-
tiffs to sue in the Court of Claims.36
B. Majority vs. Dissent
The four-justice majority sided with the State. While Correction Law §
24's removal of a fact-specific DOCS-defendant § 1983 suit from the New
30. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 24 (McKinney 2009); see also CT. CL. ACT, art. II §§ 8-9
(McKinney 2009); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. State, 415 N.Y.S.2d 949 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1979).
31. Haywood v. Drown, 826 N.Y.S.2d 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
32. Haywood v. Drown, 881 N.E.2d at 183 (quoting Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, &
Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912)); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180
(1961) (enunciating § 1983's underlying policies).
33. Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 186.
34. See id. at 185-86; see also City Const. Dev., Inc. v. Comm'r of N.Y. State Office of
Gen. Servs., 575 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Alden v. Maine 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
36. See CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 2009); see also Woodward v. State of New York,
805 N.Y.S.2d 670, 673 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
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York Supreme Court appeared "questionable" under the Supremacy
Clause,3 7 the court explained that:
the policy underlying the Supremacy Clause is to maintain an equilibrium
between state and federal causes of action: if a state opens its doors to a
state cause of action, it must also allow related federal claims to be heard;
but if the state does not hear a particular state claim, it may also decline to
consider related federal causes of action in its state courts.
38
Since Correction Law § 24 removed subject matter jurisdiction over all
state law damages claims against DOCS personnel, the New York Supreme
Court was at liberty to decline cognizance over a related § 1983 claim.
Additionally, the statute was consistent with the Supremacy Clause's anti-
discrimination rule. As characterized by the Haywood majority, that rule
"prohibits ... refusal by a state court to entertain a suit for the sole reason
that the cause of action arises under federal law." 39 Correction Law § 24
met this requirement since it treated both state and federal law claims
against DOCS personnel identically.
Finally, the court agreed that Correction Law § 24 reflects the State's as-
sumption of responsibility over DOCS-defendant suits, 40 and concluded
that the State merely "exercise[d] its prerogative to establish the subject
matter jurisdiction of the state courts in a manner consistent with New
York's conditional waiver of sovereign immunity. 41 It affirmed the dis-
missal and dispatched the plaintiff to the Court of Claims.
The three-justice dissent, recognizing the inherent tension between the
Supremacy Clause and New York's prerogative to establish its courts' ju-
risdiction, struck a different balance. To the dissent, the inquiry should
have sidestepped Correction Law § 24's text or purpose. Rather, the rele-
vant analysis should start by identifying the Congressional policies under-
lying the federal right and, in light of the Supremacy Clause's policy that
states enforce federal law, assessing whether New York's excuse interferes
with those policies.42 As for 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the policies of deterring
state misconduct and compensating victims of civil rights violations were
sufficient to trump the State's asserted interest in limiting the number of
37. The court noted that "[c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which is
wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... cannot be immunized by state law." Haywood, 881
N.E.2d at 183 (quoting Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980)).
38. Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 184 (citing Missouri ex rel S. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 4
(1950)).
39. Id. (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 373 (1990)).
40. See also N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(2)-(3) (McKinney 2008).
41. Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 186.
42. See id. at 188 (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139
(1988)).
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(often frivolous) lawsuits against individual DOCS employees. 43  The
State's claim that Correction Law § 24 was a neutral rule of judicial ad-
ministration 44 was simply too generous. The statute was far from neutral
since it singled out a fact-specific cause of action for adverse treatment,
leaving the state law remedy intact in the Court of Claims while extinguish-
ing the analogous § 1983 remedy. 45 And the assertion that Correction Law
§ 24 was merely an exercise of the State's prerogative to determine state
court jurisdiction was irrelevant insofar as it conflicted with federal law. 46
Jurisdictional or not, the statute embodied a substantive policy decision to
transfer liability from individual DOCS employees to the State, 47 which
plainly conflicted with § 1983's policies.48
II. DEFINING "ANALOGOUS" STATE LAW CLAIMS
The Haywood majority and dissent agreed on the basic formulation of
the antidiscrimination vle: state courts are prohibited from singling out
federal causes of action simply because they emanate from Congress and
not from the states' respective legislatures. Stated in the affirmative, the
antidiscrimination rule imposes an obligation on state courts to entertain
those federal claims which are "analogous" to the types of state law claims
the court is already enforcing. 49 There remains some difficulty, however,
in determining how to characterize the term "analogous" state law claim.50
There are two sides to the doctrinal battle. On the one hand, the term
could refer to pairs of state and federal claims that arise from identical or
closely related sets of facts. For example, Correction Law § 24 bars one
fact-specific category of state law claim: damages suits against DOCS em-
ployees acting within the scope of employment. Thus, it is possible to ar-
43. Id.
44. See infra notes 90-102 and accompanying discussions (discussing the policy behind
immunity statutes).
45. See Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 192 (Jones, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 191. In fact, the Supreme Court noted that § 24 was more akin to an "immu-
nity-from-damages provision" rather than a jurisdictional rule. As such, the State interest
was irrelevant. Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2115 (2009).
47. Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 191.
48. Id. at 191-92; see also Rogers v. Saylor, 760 P.2d 232, 238 (Or. 1988) (stating that
the state law damages cap is inapplicable in state court § 1983 actions, because it conflicted
with § 1983's goal of providing monetary relief for civil rights violations and provided par-
tial immunity for certain state officials).
49. STEINGLASS, supra note 3, § 9:9.
50. In reviewing the Haywood decision, the Supreme Court noted that it was unneces-
sary to decide whether states can be compelled to hear suits pursuant to § 1983. In fact, the
ruling likely hinged on the fact that N.Y. courts "routinely sit to hear analogous § 1983 ac-
tions." Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2116 (2009).
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gue that since the New York Supreme Court is powerless to hear such
claims, the antidiscrimination rule imposes no obligation to entertain §
1983 damages suits against DOCS employees. 51
On the other hand, "analogous" could mean "generically similar," in
which case Correction Law § 24 is irrelevant to whether the New York Su-
preme Court can hear "analogous" state law claims. Because the New
York Supreme Court is one of general jurisdiction that hears tort suits of all
shapes and sizes against all types of defendants, 52 carving away its jurisdic-
tion over a narrow subcategory of tort does not affect its power to hear
"analogous" state law claims. Under this view, any tort suit for damages is
"analogous" to the claim which Correction Law § 24 prohibits, and thus the
antidiscrimination rule should apply and require that the state court enter-
tain the § 1983 claim.
As Parts III.A and III.B show, Haywood's acceptance of the fact-specific
rendition of "analogous" overlooks at least two important threads in the
Supreme Court's Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. The more accurate
view is that a state court's jurisdiction over "analogous" state law claims
arises by virtue of its authority to hear claims that are structurally compara-
ble to § 1983 actions-specifically tort suits for damages 53-and that once
the state legislature creates a court capable of hearing generic tort suits for
damages, it obligates itself to entertain the full range of claims under §
1983.54 Since the New York Supreme Court routinely hears such claims
under state and federal law-including § 1983 claims against other state
employees and tort suits against private defendants 55-New York should
not be permitted to "selectively refuse to enforce" 56 a particular species of
§ 1983 claim.
51. See, e.g., Blount v. Stroud, 877 N.E.2d 49, 61-62 (I1! App. Ct. 2007); cf Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 378-79 (1990) (rejecting the argument that a Florida immunity statute
excluded § 1983 claims from the category of tort claims that the state court could hear).
52. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI § 7; Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 191 (Jones., J., dissenting);
De Hart v. Hatch, 3 Hun 375, 380 (1875).
53. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (explaining the expanding conception
of the antidiscrimination rule).
54. See, e.g., Neubome, supra note 5, at 747-66 (proposing an affirmative model under
which state courts of general jurisdiction would be obligated to entertain all § 1983 claims).
55. Cf id.; see also James v. Bd. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 340 N.E.2d 735, 737 (N.Y.
1975) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); Young v. Toia, 413 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
(deciding a United States Code issue); Brody v. Leamy 393 N.Y.S.2d 243, 256-57 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1977) (holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts).
56. Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 191 (Jones, J., dissenting).
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III. STATES' OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE SECTION 1983
A. What Triggers the Obligation?
As some commentators have pointed out,57 the Supreme Court has never
endeavored to clarify, at least in the context of a state's obligation to en-
force § 1983,58 exactly what constitutes an "analogous" state law claim.59
Part III.A adds clarity in this area. First, Part III.A argues that, by impli-
edly equating "analogous" with "generically similar," the Court has pro-
pounded a far more onerous obligation to hear § 1983 claims than the
Haywood majority appreciated. Second, while the Court has continuously
heeded the principle that state legislatures retain discretion to determine
state court jurisdiction, it has suggested that by creating courts amenable to
generic tort suits, all state legislatures have already created courts compe-
tent to hear § 1983 suits. The Court's refusal to address whether states
must create forums amenable to § 1983 indicates its belief that states have
already locked themselves into the antidiscrimination rule by creating
courts capable of hearing generic tort suits.
1. The Broad Scope of the Antidiscrimination Rule
The New York Court of Appeals held that Correction Law § 24 was a
"valid excuse" to decline cognizance over the plaintiffs federal § 1983 suit
in part because the statute applied to both the federal and state law compo-
nents of a narrow subclass of DOCS-defendant tort suits.60 This type of ju-
risdictional maneuvering, dubbed by some commentators as the "analogous
state-created [claim]" excuse, has meager support in Supreme Court
cases. 61 The Supreme Court has never actually approved of a state court's
selective exclusion of a particular federal claim based on a facially neutral
jurisdictional limitation such as Correction Law § 24.62 The only apparent
57. STEINGLASS, supra note 3, § 9:2 (noting that the Supreme Court could have clarified
states' obligation to enforce § 1983 by explaining what specifically is meant by similar state
law claims).
58. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272-76 (1985) (describing the proper charac-
terization of § 1983 claims for the purposes of finding a state law analogue, whose statute of
limitations would apply to § 1983 suits in that court).
59. See Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2117 (2009) ("[We have never equated
,analogous claims' with 'identical claims."').
60. Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 183-85.
61. See Haywood 129 S. Ct. at 2116 ("[W]e now make clear that equality of treatment
does not ensure that a state law will be deemed a neutral law of judicial administration and
therefore a valid excuse for refusing to entertain a federal cause of action."); Redish &
Muench, supra note 2, at 350-51; Neuborne, supra note 5, at 747-66.
62. STEINGLASS, supra note 3, § 9:9.
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support for such maneuvering lies in the Court's failure to squarely reject
it.6
3
In Mondou v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad Co., for ex-
ample, a Connecticut court refused to take cognizance over a claim under
the Federal Employer Liability Act ("FELA").64 The Connecticut court did
not claim that its jurisdiction was inadequate to hear the type of claim at is-
sue-a personal injury suit for damages-but simply disagreed with the
Act's pro-liability policies and believed that it was under no obligation to
hear the claim since it originated from a foreign legislative body.65 In re-
sponse, the Supreme Court declared:
[t]he suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy
of the state, and therefore that the courts of the state are free to decline ju-
risdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal con-
templation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of the power
confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the
people and all the states, and thereby established a policy for all. That
policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated
from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts
of the state.
66
Thus, the Supremacy Clause ties federal law and state courts together by
requiring that Congressional policy be incorporated into state policy; once
a state court receives authority to entertain certain causes of action under
state law, it must proceed to enforce all similar federal law claims.67 In
Mondou, since the Connecticut court had general jurisdiction over FELA-
type actions under both Connecticut and out-of-state law, it had an obliga-
tion to entertain the FELA claim.
68
But in Mondou, the Connecticut court's authority to hear "analogous"
state law claims was conceded. The issue, instead, was whether the court
could nonetheless dismiss the federal claim solely because it disagreed with
the Act's underlying policy (to which the Supreme Court answered in the
negative). Thus, the case could be read for a rather narrow proposition:
state courts that have opened their doors to certain state law claims are pro-
hibited from dismissing "analogous" federal claims on grounds of policy
disagreement. What remained unanswered was whether a state may delib-
63. See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 351-53.
64. 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
65. Id. at 4-5.
66. Id. at 57.
67. Id. at 58 ("The existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to exercise
it.").
68. Id.
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erately remove jurisdiction over state claims in an effort to defeat enforce-
ment of their "analogous" federal counterparts. 69
Furthermore, as Professor Sandalow has pointed out, Mondou's wide-
sweeping admonishment that federal policy is "policy for all" would have
supported a much broader obligation than that which actually resulted from
the facts of the case. 70 Indeed, the Court probably did not have to declare
that federal policy and state policy are one and the same in order to reverse
the Connecticut court, since that court routinely recognized factually iden-
tical rights under state law and thus the discrimination against FELA claims
was blatant.7 1 Therefore, Mondou could be read narrowly to condemn dis-
crimination only where there exists a precisely identical state-based right
that the state court is enforcing.
Nonetheless, the Court in Testa v. Katt72 and, more recently, Felder v.
Casey,73 applied the antidiscrimination rule to prohibit a state court from
dismissing a federal claim even where the state court would not have en-
forced a factually identical state-based right. In Testa, a car purchaser sued
under the Federal Emergency Price Control Act in Rhode Island state court
after buying a car for $210 more than the price limit. The state court dis-
missed and held that since the federal claim emanated from a foreign legis-
lative body, the state court had no obligation to entertain it. The Supreme
Court relied on Mondou and reversed. Since Rhode Island would have en-
forced "the same type of claim arising under Rhode Island law," the Rhode
Island court was bound to enforce the plaintiffs federal claim.7 4 Curi-
ously, the only evidence that the state court could hear similar claims was
the court's routine enforcement of claims under a similar federal statute-
the Fair Labor Standards Act-as well as other state penal laws (the Emer-
gency Price Control Act was considered a penal statute since it allowed
treble damage recovery). In fact, the Rhode Island court did not recognize
any state-based right to recover for high car prices (because the legislature
had not created such a right).75 Thus, when the court declared that Rhode
Island would have heard the "same type of claim," it meant this: as long as
the state court recognizes state law rights that are generically similar-not
69. Even the Supreme Court's opinion in Haywood declined to address this issue. See
Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2116 (2009) ("[T]his case does not require us to de-
cide whether Congress may compel a State to offer a forum, otherwise unavailable under
state law, to hear suits brought pursuant to § 1983.").
70. Sandalow, supra note 8, at 205; Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 356-57 n. 195.
71. Neuborne, supra note 5, at 757 n.140.
72. 330 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1947).
73. 487 U.S. 131, 153 (1988).
74. Testa, 330 U.S. at 392-93.
75. Id. at 394; see Neuborne, supra note 5, at 757 n.140.
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merely factually identical-to the federal right at issue, the antidiscrimina-
tion rule imposes an obligation on the state court to take cognizance over
the federal claim.7
6
The Supreme Court in Felder v. Casey further expanded the antidis-
crimination rule by finding discrimination even where a state law applied
identically to both state and federal claims.77 There, the plaintiff sued Mil-
waukee police officers under § 1983 in Wisconsin state court. Wisconsin
had a notice-of-claim statute that required all plaintiffs suing state officials
to provide notice of intent to sue and a detailed claim for relief within a cer-
tain time period after the incident. 78 After the state court dismissed plain-
tiff's claim for failure to comply with this requirement, 79 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider whether such rules should ever apply to
§ 1983 claims in state court.80
While most of the Felder case was framed in terms of preemption (i.e.,
whether the notice-of-claim was incompatible with § 1983's purpose and
thus preempted), Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, explained that
the statute discriminated against § 1983 claims even though it would also
have applied to a state-law tort suit arising from the same incident.81 The
Court reasoned that, because it applied only to governmental-defendant
suits and thus "condition[ed] the right to bring suit against the very persons
and entities Congress intended to subject to liability,"82 it "most emphati-
cally does discriminate in a manner detrimental to the federal right., 83 In
the Court's view, the statute's flaw was that it embodied a substantive pol-
icy goal of minimizing liability and the expenses associated therewith; yet
this goal was "patently incompatible with the compensatory goals of the
federal legislation ...."8 It also placed a burden on state-court § 1983
claimants that was wholly absent in both federal court § 1983 actions and
in state court tort suits against private defendants. 85
Felder's analysis is crucial because it seems to stand the antidiscrimina-
tion rule on its head. The Court found discrimination, not based on any
76. See Neuborne, supra note 5, at 757 n.140. But see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999) (rejecting expansion of Testa to include selective waivers of state sovereign immu-
nity); Steinglass, supra note 8, at 445.
77. 487 U.S. at 153.
78. Id at 136; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(1)(a)-(b) (West 2009).
79. Felder v. Casey, 408 N.W.2d 19 (Wis. 1987).
80. Felder, 487 U.S. at 138.
81. Id. at 145.
82. Id. at 144.
83. Id. at 146.
84. Id. at 143.
85. Id at 141.
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disparate treatment between state-based rights and their federal counter-
parts, but based on the state rule's particular impact on the § 1983 cause of
action.86  It was irrelevant that the notice-of-claim imposed an identical
burden on state law claims against police officers; the fact that the statute
obstructed § 1983's policies of deterrence and compensation by condition-
ing the right to recover was sufficient justification to conclude that it of-
fended the Supremacy Clause's mandate that federal law reign supreme.87
Therefore, post-Felder analysis begins by examining the federal right at
stake, identifying its policies, and then asking whether the state rule ob-
structs those policies-regardless of the extent to which it impairs any
"analogous" state law right.88
Given the Court's increasingly holistic treatment of the antidiscrimina-
tion principle, the practice of selectively excluding fact-specific federal
causes of action from trial courts of general jurisdiction appears difficult to
justify.89 The discrimination condemned in Testa and Felder extended far
86. Id. at 139-40. Justice O'Connor, in dissent, admonished the majority's adoption of
"a new theory of discrimination, under which the challenged statute is said to 'condition the
right to bring suit against the very person and entities [viz., local governments and officials]
Congress intended to subject to liability."' Id. at 160 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor believed that it was sufficient that the notice-of-claim requirement applied to both
federal and state claims of action. O'Connor's dissent notwithstanding, the antidiscrimina-
tion rule as it currently exists appears to involve a comparison between the state court's
treatment of general classes of causes of action-tort, breach of contract, etc.-to the spe-
cific right embodied in § 1983.
87. See Dice v. Akron, 342 U.S. 359 (1952). The Court held that federal law governs
whether plaintiff waived his right to sue under FELA. The state's waiver law substantially
disfavored FELA plaintiffs and was, thus,
incongruous with the general policy of the Act ... because the federal rights af-
fording relief to injured railroad employees under a federally declared standard
could be defeated if states were permitted to have the final say as to what defenses
could and could not be properly interposed to suits under the act.
Id. at 362; see also Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding invalid
a Wyoming statute that required plaintiffs accepting settlements in connection with em-
ployment-related disputes to waive all claims against employees because the statute "inter-
fere[d] with the policy of preventing abuses of power by those acting under color of state
law").
88. Felder, 487 U.S. at 138 ("The question ... is [whether] the application of the State's
notice-of-claim provision to § 1983 actions brought in state courts [is] consistent with the
goals of the federal civil rights laws, or [whether] the enforcement of such a requirement
instead stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637 (1971)).
89. Steinglass, supra note 8, at 381 n.293 ("Because a categorical exclusion of a feder-
ally created cause of action [from state courts discriminates] against that cause of action,
even if the [analogous] state-created [actions are also] excluded, it is possible to use the
nondiscrimination framework to impose a duty on state courts that goes beyond [their obli-
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beyond mere disparate treatment between fact-specific state and federal
causes of action. After Testa, a state court should be obligated to hear fed-
eral claims so long as its jurisdiction extends over generically similar state
law claims. After Felder, a state statute purporting to bar or condition the
right to recover under § 1983 will be preempted whenever it conflicts sub-
stantially with the Act's underlying policies. Thus, the antidiscrimination
rule requires not only that a state who opens its courts to generic tort suits
provide forums amenable to § 1983, but that such forums remain as hospi-
table to § 1983 claims as federal courts would be.
2. The Rule: Triggered by Jurisdictional Grant Over Generic Tort Suits
a. States' Discretion to Create State Forums
While Felder seemed to close the door on any chance that a state may
selectively exclude a subspecies of § 1983 from its courts, the New York
Court of Appeals somehow managed to manufacture its own justification
for upholding Correction Law § 24 in Haywood. It did so by impliedly dis-
tinguishing the statute from the notice-of-claim at issue in Felder in a
seemingly important way. While the notice-of-claim was merely a proce-
dural rule governing the treatment of § 1983 claims already in state court,
Correction Law § 24 dealt with the state courts' authority to hear them in
the first instance.9" The importance of this distinction, however, is spuri-
ous.
It is true that the Supreme Court has made efforts to sustain the concept
of a far-reaching and unimpeded authority of state legislatures to control
the jurisdictional qualities of their courts. 91 As early as Mondou, for in-
stance, the Court went out of its way to note that nothing in FELA purports
"to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of the state courts." 92 Even though
the Connecticut court's jurisdiction was already adequate to the occasion,
the State would have been free to organize the jurisdiction of its courts in a
gation] to refrain from treating [actions to enforce federal law differently than actions to en-
force state law.]").
90. See Haywood v. Drown, 881 N.E.2d 180, 185-86 (N.Y. 2007) ("By restricting the
forum for a certain type of claim to a particular state court, the Legislature did nothing more
than exercise its prerogative to establish the subject matter jurisdiction of state courts in a
manner consistent with New York's conditional waiver of sovereign immunity .... ); cf
Janda v. Detroit, 437 N.W.2d 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Rogers v. Saylor, 760 P.2d 232
(Or. 1988) (en banc); see also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247 (1978).
91. See generally Neubome, supra note 5, at 747-66; Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at
340-59; Sandalow, supra note 8, at 205.
92. Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 56 (1912).
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manner that could conceivably render the Act unreachable. Later, in
McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co.,9' another FELA case,
the Court adopted a similar analysis and held that an Alabama court was
obligated to entertain the federal claim because the state had already
"granted to its circuit courts general jurisdiction of the class of actions to
which that here brought belongs. .. ."94 In so holding, the Court carefully
noted that "Congress has not attempted to compel states to provide courts
for the enforcement of [FELA]." 95
Nonetheless, in the recent case of Howlett v. Rose, the Court signaled
that the Supremacy Clause must necessarily limit the principle that states
retain wide latitude in administering their judiciaries.96  There, a high
school student brought a § 1983 action in Florida state court against a
school board alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations stem-
ming from an alleged illegal search of his car. 97 By statute, Florida had
waived sovereign immunity, thus allowing the State to be sued with respect
to state law-but not federal law--claims. This resultant partial immunity
also applied to public entities like the defendant school board, which would
otherwise be subject to § 1983 liability in federal court. The result: a Flor-
ida school board was immune from § 1983 claims brought in state but not
federal court. The Florida District Court of Appeals upheld this statutory
scheme and dismissed the federal claim.9
8
The State had argued that federal law "takes the state courts as it finds
them" and that the Florida legislature was therefore within its rights to re-
move state court jurisdiction over certain § 1983 claims. 99 But the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected this assertion and found that despite the jurisdic-
93. 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
94. Id. at 233; see also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 380 (1990); Boyd v. Robeson
County, 621 S.E.2d 1, 8 (N.C. 2005) ("[Petitioners] would have us hold that, although a su-
perior court has jurisdiction over sheriffs for tort claims because a sheriff is a local govern-
mental officer, it does not have authority to hear a § 1983 claim against the sheriff because,
for the federal claim, he is part of 'the State.' This constitutes discrimination against § 1983
claims in violation of the Supremacy Clause.") (citing McKnett, 292 U.S. at 234).
95. McKnett, 292 U.S. at 233.
96. 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
97. Id. at 359.
98. Id. at 359-60.
99. In Howlett v. Rose, the Court explained:
The requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the
law of the land does not necessarily include within it a requirement that the State
create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is presented.
The general rule, 'bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of
state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.'
Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372 (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Fed-
eral Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 508 (1954)).
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tional tack, Florida's selective immunity statutes were grounded in substan-
tive policy and did not reflect "the concerns of power over the person and
competence over the subject matter that jurisdictional rules are designed to
protect."' 10 Since the Florida court would have enforced state law tort suits
against the school board and even § 1983 suits against individual school of-
ficials, there was no state interest (aside from shielding school boards from
§ 1983 liability) that could pass muster under the Supremacy Clause. Flor-
ida's statutory scheme blatantly conflicted with § 1983's remedial and de-
terrent purposes, and despite the State's attempt to characterize the statute
as jurisdictional, the Supreme Court admonished that "the force of the Su-
premacy Clause is not so weak that it can be evaded by mere mention of
the word 'jurisdiction." 0'l
Thus, after Howlett, merely characterizing a state law as "jurisdictional"
will not, by itself, transform that law into a legitimate excuse to dismiss a §
1983 claim. Rather, Felder's preemption analysis still stands: state statutes
purporting to excuse a state court from asserting cognizance over a federal
claim--even jurisdictional limitations-must be scrutinized for the extent
to which they interfere with the federal law's underlying substantive poli-
cies-policies which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, are policies of
each of the states. 10
2
b. Adequate Forum Creation
The notion that states retain broad discretion to control the reach of their
own courts remains important as a doctrinal matter. While the Court in
Howlett dispelled the notion that a state law dubbed "jurisdictional" should
trump the Supremacy Clause, it specifically noted that an open question
remains as to whether states must create forums to hear § 1983 claims in
the first instance. 10 3 Indeed, in every case in which the Court struck down
a state's refusal to entertain the federal claim, the state courts' adequacy to
hear analogous state law claims was conceded and thus the must-create-
forums question was never squarely addressed.' 0 4 The same is true for §
100. Id. at 381.
101. Id. at 382-83.
102. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
103. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 378 n.20; Steinglass, supra note 8, at 439-40; see also su-
pra note 69.
104. Steinglass, supra note 8, at 434 ("[Testa and Howlett] make the minimalist assump-
tion that the state has already created courts with ordinary jurisdiction to hear such cases and
neither case reaches the theoretically interesting (but never likely to be addressed directly)
issue of whether states were required to create courts that could hear federal causes of ac-
tion."); see, e.g., Howlett, 496 U.S. at 356; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); McKnett v.
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1983: since virtually every state has opened its doors to § 1983 claims, 10 5
there has never been a need to consider whether states must create forums
in which to hear them. If this question is truly open, then states should at
least try to argue that stripping a state court of jurisdiction over § 1983
claims is really just a decision to refrain altogether from creating a forum
amenable to such claims. But this begs the question: when should a state
be considered to have already created a forum adequate to hear § 1983
claims? There are at least two answers-one broad, one narrow-but the
Supreme Court's declarations support the broader view: an adequate forum
is one that hears claims that are generally analogous in structure to § 1983
claims.
Consider first the narrow view. Under this view, a forum is adequate to
hear § 1983 claims only if it hears a state law claim arising from an identi-
cal set of facts as the federal claim. Under this view, it could be argued
that New York Correction Law § 24, by removing subject matter jurisdic-
tion over state law damages suits against DOCS employees acting within
the scope of employment, has merely failed to create a forum amenable to
any § 1983 damages suit alleging a DOCS employee committed a tort. 116
This is also what happened in Blount v. Stroud,10 7 which dealt with an Illi-
nois statute that removed the state trial courts' jurisdiction over human
rights claims-state and federal-and vested a specialized tribunal with ex-
clusive authority to adjudicate them.'0 8 The court explained that the situa-
tion was the converse of Howlett, because to impose an obligation on the
trial court to hear the plaintiff's federal claim would have required the state
to create a court amenable to it. 109 But Howlett imposed no such require-
St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford
R.R. Co., 232 U.S. 1 (1912).
105. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277, 283 n.7 (1980); see also Mondou, 223 U.S. at 56; Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130,
140-41 (1876); THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton).
106. STE NGLASS, supra note 3, § 9.9 (noting that, by failing to address the must-create-
forums question, the Court has "been able to maintain the fiction that states make the volun-
tary decision to hear federal causes of action even though this approach effectively requires
state courts to hear federal causes of action").
107. 877 N.E.2d 49, 61-62 (I11. App. Ct. 2007).
108. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-111 (c) (West 2009).
109. See also Meehan v. Ill. Power Co., 808 N.E.2d 555, 559 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Faulk-
ner-King v. Wicks, 590 N.E.2d 511, 518 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). The Illinois Supreme Court
recently abrogated these decisions and held that the Illinois Circuit courts had jurisdiction
over federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Blount v. Stroud, 904 N.E.2d 1, 18 (Ill. 2009).
The opinion, however, was one of statutory construction. The state statute applied to civil
rights violations, which the court held to encompass only violations of state-but not fed-
eral-law. Thus, the court avoided deciding whether the Supremacy Clause would have
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ment. Rather, the Illinois Supreme Court endorsed the view that the state
courts were inadequate to hear the federal claim because they lacked au-
thority to hear factually identical state law claims. "10
This view is attractive because it allows states' rights proponents to ar-
gue that because the state has failed to create an adequate forum, the prin-
ciple that "federal law takes state courts as it finds them"' should prevail.
If creation occurs only through a jurisdictional grant over a fact-specific
claim, then the question of the state court's obligation to hear a federal
claim, which began as "is the court adequate to the occasion" (a question
the Court has a much easier time answering in the affirmative), transforms
into "can Congress compel states to re-open their courthouse doors" (a
question the Court has stayed away from, and in any event would likely an-
swer in the negative). The latter analysis provides a far more persuasive
weapon in the state's defense arsenal.
Yet a contrary, and better, approach holds that the must-create-forums
question is triggered at a much earlier stage in the analysis. Under this
view, a state court's authority-especially a trial court of general jurisdic-
tion such as the New York Supreme Court-cannot be described as a cata-
logue of every fact-specific state cause of action it entertains. 1 2 Such ju-
risdiction, instead, ought to be characterized in terms of general causes of
action the court adjudicates,' 13 the remedies the court is capable of furnish-
ing, and whether the court can assert personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dants." 4 Under this view, a state creates a court amenable to § 1983 claims
by setting up a court capable of: a) hearing tort suits," 5 b) awarding dam-
ages or other relief authorized under the statute, 116 and c) exercising per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendants.1 7 In setting up such a court-which
New York has in the state Supreme Court-a state locks itself into the anti-
discrimination rule; it must enforce all "analogous" § 1983 claims, 118
which, practically speaking, means any § 1983 claim.
required the Illinois courts to take cognizance over the federal claim had the state statute
purported to remove such jurisdiction.
110. Blount, 904 N.E.2d at 16.
111. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990).
112. See, e.g., De Hart v. Hatch, 3 Hun 375, 380 (1875). The New York Supreme
Court's jurisdiction is so expansive that there is in fact some question as to whether Correc-
tion Law § 24 violates the New York Constitution, which states that it cannot be limited by
legislative action.
113. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
114. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 378-79.
115. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
116. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 356, 373-74.
117. Id. at 373.
118. See, e.g., McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934).
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To illustrate why this view makes sense in light of Supreme Court case
law, imagine a state statute that barred all New York courts from hearing
any claim against state officials, leaving no forum for any claim whatso-
ever against these defendants. Assuming this would comport with the
state's own constitution, the question then arises whether such a statute
could constitutionally be applied to bar a § 1983 action in a state court of
general jurisdiction (i.e., the New York Supreme Court) that routinely
hears, for example, slip-and-falls or intentional assault claims against pri-
vate defendants under state law.
By blocking an entire class of state and federal claims-rather than one
fact-specific subcategory-this hypothetical statute presents a much more
compelling case for considering the must-create-forums argument. 119 In-
stead of picking and choosing among causes of action, the statute removes
the entire category of state-defendant claims and thus it is much easier to
accept the notion that the entire state court system might be inadequate to
adjudicate such claims. Further, it is unlikely that the legislature would use
such a statute to discriminate against § 1983 actions, since many claims
against state officials fail to rise to a sufficient level of Constitutional im-
portance to warrant § 1983 redress.' 20
Nonetheless, a close reading of Supreme Court cases would support a
holding that even this type of across-the-board jurisdictional limit would be
an insufficient basis to decline cognizance over the § 1983 claim. This is
because each time the Court approaches the question of whether states must
fashion forums amenable to federal claims, it tends to treat the question as
having already been answered by the State's decision to grant the state
court power to hear generic tort suits. In other words, the Court's persistent
declaration that the must-create-forums question is open evinces the
Court's belief that states, by setting up courts to hear generic tort claims,
are already creating such forums.
In Mondou, for example, the Court pointed out that in FELA, there is
"not... any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of
state courts." 121 Thus, the Court never reached the must-create-forums
question. Rather, the Court apparently believed that the question was obvi-
ated by the fact that the Connecticut court's "ordinary jurisdiction, as pre-
119. Cf STE1NGLASS, supra note 3, § 9:8 ("To exclude § 1983 cases, states would have to
close their courts to similar actions authorized by state and federal law against state and lo-
cal governmental bodies and their employees.").
120. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (finding some minor state actor
misconduct unactionable under § 1983; to hold otherwise would "make . . . the Fourteenth
Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be
administered by the States") (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
121. Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 56 (1912).
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scribed by local laws, is appropriate to the occasion." '22 Specifically, the
Connecticut court was "empowered to take cognizance of actions to re-
cover for personal injuries and for death .... 123
Then, in Testa, the Court traced Mondou and found that the Rhode Is-
land court was obligated to take cognizance of an Emergency Price Control
Act claim because "this same type of claim" would have been enforced in
that court.'2 4 And again, by citing to Mondou, the Court apparently recog-
nized that it was not purporting to answer the must-create-forums ques-
tion.125 So we must ask: how do we know that Rhode Island had already
created such a forum? Testa's answer-because the court could enforce
similar claims including state-law penal claims and those arising under a
similar federal statute-evinces the Court's belief that the State had already
created an adequate forum by granting the court jurisdiction over generi-
cally similar state and federal law claims.126
And in Howlett, the Court explicitly stated, "[t]his case does not present
the questions whether Congress can require the states to create a forum
with the capacity to enforce federal statutory rights or to authorize service
of process on parties who would not otherwise be subject to the court's ju-
risdiction." 127 Thus, as in Mondou and Testa, the Court recognized that the
must-create-forums question was not ripe. How, though, was the Court
able to avoid the question? Because the Florida court was one of general
jurisdiction that hears:
tort claims by private citizens against state entities (including school
boards), of the size and type of petitioner's claim here, and it can enter
judgment against them. That court also exercises jurisdiction over § 1983
actions against individual officers and is fully competent to provide the
remedies the federal statute requires. 128
122. Id. at 56-57.
123. Id. at 57.
124. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).
125. See id. at 392.
126. See also McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934) ("Congress
has not attempted to compel states to provide courts for [FELA enforcement] .... ") Thus,
the Court recognized that the case was not about whether states are obligated to create fo-
rums amenable to federal claims. Rather, in the Court's view, the issue was whether the
state had already created such a forum. Reasoning that the state court had "general jurisdic-
tion of the class of actions to which that here brought belongs, in cases between litigants
situated like those in the case at bar," including factually identical claims arising within the
state, out-of-state accidents where one party was a domestic corporation, and out-of-state
accidents involving interstate commerce, the Court found that the state court was indeed an
adequate forum. Id. at 232.
127. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 378 (1990).
128. Id. at 378-79.
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Thus, by referencing tort claims instead of claims against school boards
for certain fact-specific infractions, the Court was principally concerned
with the general subject matter of the claim at issue and whether the court
can furnish the remedies sought-not with the specific facts underlying the
claim. 129 Furthermore, the Florida court's ability to exercise personal ju-
risdiction over the individual defendants--despite the immunity statute
which purported to carve away such jurisdiction-provided additional evi-
dence of the court's adequacy.
Because the Court has never seen the need to answer the must-create-
forums question, and because it believes a state court is adequate to hear §
1983 claims by virtue of its authority to hear generic tort suits, a state's ob-
ligation to enforce § 1983 should be unaffected by any state statute limiting
subject matter jurisdiction over the entire range of state-defendant suits. A
state's obligation arises as soon as it creates a court capable of hearing tort
suits, awarding the relief sought, and exercising personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. 1
30
B. What is the Nature of the Obligation?
Part III.A raised and answered an important question about the obliga-
tion of states to entertain claims arising under § 1983. The antidiscrimina-
tion principle, which requires that states treat "analogous" federal and state
law claims identically, is triggered as soon as a state creates a court amena-
ble to generic torts suits. Part III.B moves away from the obligation itself
and discusses how that obligation should be carried out. As explained be-
low, several principles discerned from Supreme Court cases-including the
so-called "valid excuse" doctrine and Felder v. Casey's prohibition against
burdening federal rights-set the parameters of states' duty to enforce §
1983. This Part argues that the New York Court of Appeals misinterpreted
these principles in refusing to enforce a fact-specific § 1983 claim based on
a jurisdictional barrier that completely extinguished the § 1983 remedy
129. Id. (The Florida court "also exercises jurisdiction over § 1983 actions against indi-
vidual officers and is fully competent to provide the remedies the federal statute requires");
see also STEINGLASS, supra note 3, § 9:9.
130. Note that personal jurisdiction is a geographical and contact-related concept. A state
court cannot assert lack of personal jurisdiction on substantive policy grounds (such as to
immunize state actors) when it would otherwise be able to reach the defendant had he not
been acting on behalf of the State. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 381 ("The fact that a rule is de-
nominated jurisdictional does not provide a court an excuse to avoid the obligation to en-
force federal law if the rule does not reflect the concerns of power over the person and com-
petence over the subject matter that jurisdictional rules are designed to protect."); see also
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980) ("Conduct by persons acting under
color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... cannot be immunized by
state law.") (internal quotations marks omitted).
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while leaving the state remedy intact. These principles do, however, leave
open the possibility that a state may remove jurisdiction over specific §
1983 claims, so long as it provides an equally-accessible alternative forum
to hear them.
Once a state submits to the antidiscrimination rule and thereby obligates
itself to entertain the full range of claims under § 1983, a wholly separate
question arises regarding how states must administer their judiciaries in or-
der to fulfill that obligation. Indeed, there is a line of Supreme Court cases
suggesting that, even if a state has a duty to provide forums for § 1983, an
individual state court may decline to entertain a § 1983 claim by presenting
a "valid excuse." 131 This practice has been equated with a "neutral state
rule regarding the administration of courts."' 32 The Haywood majority,
drawing on these cases, held that Correction Law § 24 was a valid exercise
of the State's discretion to determine state court jurisdiction, 133 and that the
Court of Claims' inability to hear § 1983 suits did not amount to any sig-
nificant level of discrimination. 1
34
1. The "Valid Excuse" Balancing
To understand this so-called "valid excuse" doctrine and its underlying
function, it is helpful to revisit Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hart-
ford Railroad Co., 135 the case credited with the doctrine's genesis. There,
the Supreme Court upheld a New York court's refusal to enforce a claim
under FELA based on a New York statute granting trial judges discretion to
dismiss transitory actions between two non-resident corporations.' 3 6 The
Court, recognizing the balance to be struck between the federal policy of
having state courts enforce federal law and states' discretion to set their
courts' jurisdiction, held that "[FELA] does not purport to require [s]tate
[c]ourts to entertain suits arising under it ... as against an otherwise valid
excuse." 137 Apparently, New York's asserted interest in giving New York
residents priority in access to its "often overcrowded" courts138 was press-
ing enough that requiring the state court to enforce out-of-state FELA
131. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 357; Missouri ex rel S. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 5 (1950);
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120 (1945); Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R.
Co., 279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929); cf McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233
(1934).
132. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372.
133. Haywood v. Drown, 881 N.E.2d 180, 185 (N.Y. 2007).
134. Id. at 186.
135. 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
136. Id. at 387-88.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 387.
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claims would be unfair. This was especially true since a) New York courts
would still entertain in-state FELA claims, and b) other states were avail-
able-and presumably more appropriate venues-to enforce the plaintiffs
claim. 139 Recognizing that an adequate state forum was available to hear
the federal claim and that there existed no serious threat to the policy that
states share responsibility for adjudicating federal claims, the Court ac-
cepted New York's interest and approved of the state court's decision to
decline jurisdiction. 140
The Court cited Douglas a few years later in McKnett v. St. Louis & San
Francisco Railway Co.,141 but held that an Alabama statute construed as
barring federal-but not state-claims arising from out-of-state accidents
could not be applied to dismiss a FELA claim. 142 The Court noted that the
Alabama court had "general jurisdiction of the class of actions to which
that here brought belongs,"'143 and that its decision to dismiss the FELA
claim was "based solely upon the source of law sought to be enforced."'"
Thus, there was no justifiable state interest in judicial administration that
would have supported the dismissal. And since the Alabama court was one
of general jurisdiction, the dismissal would likely have rendered the federal
claim completely unenforceable in any Alabama forum.
The Court in Herb v. Pitcairn145 distinguished McKnett and held that an
Illinois city court, whose jurisdiction as construed by the Illinois Supreme
Court, extended only to causes of action arising within city borders, was
powerless to enforce plaintiffs out-of-city FELA claim. 146 It would seem
that the Illinois legislature made a deliberate policy decision to create spe-
cialized tribunals with authority over local causes of action only. Forcing
the city court to entertain federal causes of action arising in other cities
would have flouted this locally-calibrated allocation of judicial resources
and seriously hindered the city court's smooth functioning. 14 7 Meanwhile,
imposing such an obligation was unnecessary in order to advance the pol-
icy that otherwise competent state courts enforce federal law, since an al-
139. See id. at 386.
140. See id. at 386-87.
141. 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
142. Id. at 234.
143. Id. at 232.
144. Id. at 234.
145. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
146. Id. at 123. An important qualification to the Court's holding, however, was that
there was no indication that Illinois had "construed the state jurisdiction and venue laws in a
discriminatory fashion." Id.
147. Seeid. at 120-21.
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ternative state court-Illinois trial courts of general jurisdiction-would
have been available to hear the FELA claim. 4 8
Also, in Missouri ex rel Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield,'49 the Su-
preme Court condoned a state court's application of forum non conveniens
to dismiss a FELA claim, so long as the state "enforces its policy impar-
tially."' 50 Such approval is consistent with the balancing underlying the
"valid excuse" cases. 151 The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows
states to mitigate the "inconvenience and hardship" of entertaining transi-
tory claims between non-residents and thereby protects the court from
overcrowded dockets. 152 Yet, it does not afford states a means to dismiss
federal claims that arise within the state. 53 Successful application offorum
non conveniens also implies that the action may-indeed should-be
brought in a different state.'
54
2. Haywood Applied
These cases reveal that the "valid excuse" doctrine promotes dual pur-
poses: to protect state judiciaries from the added costs of adjudicating for-
eign causes of action without undermining the substantive policies underly-
ing the Act or the general policy that state courts enforce federal law.'
55
This formulation is consistent with several features of Supreme Court case
law, but inconsistent with the New York Court of Appeals' application of
the "analogous" state claim excuse.
First, the dual-purpose characterization accounts for Mondou's original
admonishment that dismissing a federal claim solely because it is federal is
"quite inadmissible."' 56 A state court whose doors are already open to state
tort claims suffers little added administrative cost when it is forced to enter-
tain "analogous" § 1983 claims. 157 The only burdens that arguably exist
arise either from the state's unfamiliarity with the § 1983 cause of ac-
148. See generally Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 349-50 (explaining that the court
of limited jurisdiction validly dismissed a FELA claim).
149. 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
150. Id. at 4.
151. See, e.g., McKnett v. St. Louis S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
152. Missouri, Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Creek County, 294 P.2d 579, 582
(Okla. 1956); see 36 AM. JuR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 468 (2009).
153. See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 353-54.
154. See id. at 354.
155. See id. at 340-59.
156. Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912); see Re-
dish & Muench, supra note 2, at 355.
157. See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 355.
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tion, 58 or from the fact that many § 1983 claims are frivolous. 5 9 Yet
Howlett, along with other cases, firmly found both assertions inadequate to
trump the Supremacy Clause. 160
Moreover, the New York Supreme Court stands to benefit little in the
way of cost-saving by removing its jurisdiction over a narrow set of fact-
specific claims. Obligating the court to entertain such claims would not
impose any added burdens,16' since the court routinely adjudicates claims
that vary only minutely from those Correction Law § 24 prohibits, such as
claims for injunctive or declaratory relief against DOCS employees and
DOCS-defendant suits for torts committed outside the scope of employ-
ment.162 Meanwhile, because it extinguishes the § 1983 remedy in all New
York courts while leaving a state law remedy intact in the Court of Claims,
Correction Law § 24 threatens to undermine the Supremacy Clause by al-
lowing the State to completely avoid enforcing the federal right.
Finally, as Professor Redish has noted, selectively barring "analogous"
pairs of state and federal claims is inconsistent with the limits the Supreme
Court has placed on the valid excuse doctrine, specifically, that any "valid
158. Id. at 355 n.191. It has also been contended that the Supremacy Clause does not re-
quire state courts to afford special treatment to § 1983 claims. See Dice v. Akron, Canton,
& Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 365 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[S]imply
because there is concurrent jurisdiction in Federal and State courts over actions under
[FELA], a State is under no duty to treat actions arising under that Act differently from the
way it adjudicates local actions for negligence .... ).
159. See, e.g., Brody v. Leamy, 393 N.Y.S.2d 243, 255 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (accepting
jurisdiction over § 1983 suits meant state courts would have to "assume the burden of trying
causes of action of federal origin, incorporate into the state legal system alien concepts of
jurisprudence that could wreak havoc upon orderly common law disciplines, and inject into
the state judicial system the potential for an onerous burden of a rapidly expanding caseload
of civil rights claims that could not possibly be managed without substantial trial delay to
equally meritorious state oriented actions in the absence of an increase in judicial man-
power, the overall effect of which would necessarily lead to exacerbation of federal-state
court relationships").
160. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 380 (1990) ("A state may not ... relieve congestion
in its courts by declaring a whole category of federal claims to be frivolous."); see Mondou,
223 U.S. at 58-59 ("[T]hat its exercise may be onerous does not militate against that impli-
cation .... [I]t is neither new nor unusual in judicial proceedings to apply different rules of
law to different situations and subjects .... [I]t has never been supposed that courts are at
liberty to decline cognizance of cases of a particular class merely because the rules of law to
be applied in their adjudication are unlike those applied in other cases.").
161. In Dice v. Akron, Canton, & Youngstown R.R. Co., the dissent argued that forcing a
state court to adopt a different jury procedure for federal claims in its courts would create
undesirable "judicial hybridization." 342 U.S. at 368 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). However,
no such hybridization would occur by forcing the New York Supreme Court to entertain
DOCS-defendant § 1983 suits, so long as the procedure followed in such suits would in no
way differ from that followed in similar state law and § 1983 suits.
162. See, e.g., Ismail v. Singh, 776 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003); see also
Neuborne, supra note 5, at 747-66.
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excuse" must not violate federal law. 163 By extinguishing an "analogous"
federal right through state-wide removal of subject matter jurisdiction, the
New York legislature has apparently decided that the right to sue DOCS
employees for violating the federal constitution is wholly unworthy of en-
forcement. But Congress, in enacting § 1983, has created that right; the
Supremacy Clause should thus prohibit New York from declaring that no
such right exists. Moreover, this limitation should encompass the state leg-
islature's failure to create a precisely analogous state-based right in the first
place. That no such right exists cannot be a "valid excuse": the antidis-
crimination rule applies as soon as the State sets up a court capable of hear-
ing generically similar state causes of action and federal policy, "policy for
all."'1
64
3. The "Valid Excuse" Balancing Should Permit Selective Exclusion, so
Long as an Alternative State Forum is Provided
As explained in Part III.A the antidiscrimination rule obligates states to
enforce all § 1983 actions as soon as it creates a court amenable to generic
tort claims for damages. The "valid excuse" balancing, however, leaves
room for states to decide in whichforum to place such actions.
The State of New York, for example, created the New York Supreme
Court--capable of hearing generic tort suits-and thus brought itself under
the ambit of the antidiscrimination rule. Correction Law § 24 then remits
all damages claims against DOCS employees to the Court of Claims, a spe-
cialized tribunal that only hears claims against the State. But since the
United States Supreme Court has held that states cannot be sued under §
1983,165 a plaintiff who initially sues a DOCS employee under § 1983 in
the New York Supreme Court is forced to surrender his § 1983 claim
against the individual and accept, as a substitute, a claim against the
State. 166 By extinguishing the § 1983 claim while leaving the "analogous"
state remedy intact, the statute gives the State a means to avoid enforcing
federal law and thus undermines the notion that federal law reigns supreme.
Also, since the practical effect of § 24 is to force plaintiffs to file their
claims in federal court, the statute poses a substantial threat to Congress's
163. Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 355-56.
164. See, e.g., McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934).
165. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 87 (1989); see also White v. New
York, 615 N.Y.S.2d 811, 815 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1994).
166. This discriminatory impact was no object for the Haywood majority. 881 N.E.2d
180, 185-86 (N.Y. 2007). Since it was Congress who decided to exempt states from the
purview of § 1983, it cannot be said that the New York state legislature, in enacting Correc-
tion Law § 24, was deliberately discriminating against federal law.
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chosen distribution of judicial resources among the state and federal judici-
aries.
It is possible, however, that the New York legislature could remove the
state Supreme Court's jurisdiction over all claims-state and federal-
against DOCS employees and vest them in a separate tribunal that can hear
§ 1983 claims.' 67 In such an instance, there is little danger that the State
would be trying to discriminate against federal law, since it would not fore-
close the § 1983 cause of action but merely dictate where it should be filed.
For that same reason, such a maneuver would presumably be based not on
substantive policy concerns but on the valid administrative goal of putting
all such claims-which are voluminous and often frivolous-into special-
ized tribunals with lighter caseloads and better-informed judges.' 68 More-
over, such a statutory scheme would be consistent with Felder v. Casey-
so long as it deals with venue only and does not condition the right to re-
cover in any significant way. 169 Felder was primarily concerned that civil
rights plaintiffs were disadvantaged as compared with ordinary tort claim-
ants, a circumstance that frustrated § 1983's remedial and deterrent
goals. 170 But by providing an equally-accessible state forum for § 1983 re-
dress, the State could ensure that § 1983 plaintiffs would enjoy the full ex-
tent of rights and remedies § 1983 provides.
Thus, the obligation to hear § 1983 claims does not encompass a duty on
the part of trial courts of general jurisdiction to hear all "non-analogous"
claims. Rather, the "valid excuse" cases and Felder should permit removal
of jurisdiction over discrete pairs of state and federal claims from a court
that would, absent the state statute, be fully competent to entertain such
167. Cf Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). Professor Neuborne argues that the
"court of limited jurisdiction" excuse illustrated by Herb is essentially the only "valid ex-
cuse" the Supreme Court would have contemplated. See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at
357 n.196 (forum non conveniens also a possible "valid excuse"). I advance the broader
proposition that trial courts of general, unlimited jurisdiction could avoid the obligation to
entertain § 1983 by citing a neutral jurisdictional barrier that comports with the "valid ex-
cuse" balancing--even where the court would, absent the statute, be fully competent to en-
tertain the federal claim and serve process on the defendants. This is distinguishable from
the case where the court's ordinary jurisdiction is, due to geographical limitations, inade-
quate from the outset.
168. Cf Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 380 (1990) (noting that a state can neither assert
unfamiliarity or inconvenience as an excuse for not enforcing federal law nor declare an en-
tire category of claims to be frivolous). In my hypothetical, however, the State is asserting
these interests not as a basis to avoid enforcing § 1983, but merely to enforce it in a particu-
lar state court.
169. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 144 (1988).
170. See id.
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claims and to serve process on the defendants. 17 1 A state court of general
jurisdiction could, by citing a state statutory bar against "analogous" state
law claims, circumvent its obligation to enforce § 1983 so long as the state
rule leaves an alternative forum for enforcement of the federal right, which
interferes neither with the substantive policies embodied in the federal act
or with the policy that state courts bear some responsibility for enforcing
the federal right.1
72
CONCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING STATES' OBLIGATION
TO ENFORCE SECTION 1983
Part III argued two seemingly conflicting points about the states' obliga-
tion to enforce § 1983 and the means by which such an obligation must be
carried out. Part III.A argued that states who have opened their doors to
generic tort suits have an affirmative obligation to enforce all § 1983
claims. Yet Part III.B argued that a state could strip its courts of general
jurisdiction-which have jurisdiction over such suits-from hearing certain
fact-specific pairs of "analogous" state and federal law claims without vio-
lating the Supremacy Clause.
These points can be reconciled by characterizing a state court's obliga-
tion to hear § 1983 claims as stemming not from the jurisdictional qualities
of any one particular court but from a state's judicial structure as a
whole.'7 3 Put differently, whether a state court may decline cognizance
171. Professor Redish argues that such courts have an obligation to hear all federal causes
of action, even those for which no precisely identical state-based analogue exists, and that a
state cannot selectively remove jurisdiction to hear specific classes of state claims and
thereby defeat enforcement of the federal right. Even if both the state and federal law rights
are barred from the state court, Redish argues, that court would still have to hear the analo-
gous federal claim. See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 359 (analogous state right ex-
cuse should not be recognized because in most cases it would reflect the state's unwilling-
ness to enforce laws and policies similar to those chosen by Congress). I argue, however,
that the obligation is not so absolute. Barring "analogous" state law claims may still provide
a "valid excuse" to dismiss a § 1983 claim so long as another state court is available to hear
them. Id. at 347-51. Under such circumstances the State would still be providing an avenue
for enforcement of the federal right, and the type of evasive maneuvering condemned in
Mondou would therefore be absent.
172. Id. at 357 n.195 (noting that the Supreme Court has only struck down excuses that
"are based on reasons inimical to the federal substantive policy expressed by the federal
cause of action of those that unduly impinge on the federal jurisdictional policy of having a
state forum available to hear the federal cause of action").
173. Professor Neuborne argues that "[b]ecause each state will continue to enforce state
and federal constitutional claims in their respective courts, no state may decline to afford a
similar judicial forum to § 1983 plaintiffs." Neubome, supra note 5, at 758 (emphasis
added). Thus, Neubome would likely agree that a state satisfies its obligation by providing
some forum for § 1983 redress--even if that forum is distinct from that which hears state
and federal constitutional claims.
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over a § 1983 claim should center on how the legislature has chosen to dis-
tribute judicial business as a statewide matter.
In determining whether a state court has an obligation to entertain a §
1983 claim, the first question is whether the state should be obligated to en-
force § 1983 at all. To answer this, a reviewing court must decide whether
the state legislature has set up a court capable of entertaining tort suits for
damages. If yes, the antidiscrimination rule imposes a state-wide obliga-
tion to provide some means for plaintiffs to assert their rights under § 1983.
The next question is whether the particular court in which the claim has
been filed should hear the claim. Assuming the State is arguing that the
court is an inappropriate forum, a reviewing court should examine a num-
ber of factors, including:
The extent to which an alternative state court forum exists for § 1983 en-
forcement; 174
The extent to which filing in such an alternative forum carries with it
certain burdens or conditions that non-§ 1983 tort claimants would not oth-
erwise have to bear (including any discrepancies in available remedies); 175
and
The state's interests in remitting the § 1983 claim to such an alternative
forum, 176 and whether such interests are hostile to the § 1983's underlying
policies.
Thus, the "analogous" state law claim excuse stands on weak doctrinal
footing but retains some hypothetical vitality. Any state statute purporting
to bar "analogous" state law claims must allow for enforcement of the fed-
eral right without imposing any special burdens or conditions that claim-
ants in the original forum would not have to bear, and must further legiti-
mate administrative concerns without offending the substantive policies
underlying the Act or the general policy that state courts share in the bur-
den of adjudicating federal causes of action.
174. See generally Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) (holding that a city court of lim-
ited jurisdiction was under no obligation to enforce federal claims arising from out-of-state
accidents, but other state forums were available to hear such claims). If no alternative fo-
rum exists, then this is the end of the inquiry and the court must hear the § 1983 claim. That
is the situation created by Correction Law § 24. Haywood v. Drown, 881 N.E.2d 180, 192
(N.Y. 2007) (Jones, J., dissenting).
175. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 914, 920, 922 (1997) (holding that a state rule
denying a right to interlocutory appeal from denial of qualified immunity-based motions for
summary judgment is applicable in state court § 1983 actions); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S.
131, 144-45 (1988) (holding that notice-of-claim requirements are inapplicable in state court
§ 1983 actions).
176. Missouri ex rel S. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 4 (1950) (forum non conveniens); see
Herb, 324 U.S. at 123 (geographic distribution of judicial business); Douglas v. N.Y., New
Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929) (resident preference in access).
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